PROOF THAT OBAMA IS LYING

Bin Laden’s assassination is not a victory against terrorism. Rather there is likelihood that terrorism after OBL’s death many not only not reduce —but may even increase. His death will not have the slightest effect on the Taliban or the war in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, even if the Pakistani government consciously shielded bin Laden, there is not much the US can do about it. 

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by Michael C. Ruppert

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I have personally interrogated underage criminal suspects who could lie better than White House Press Secretary Jay Carney. It has been four days since the P.T. Barnum proclamation of the death of Osama bin Laden (OBL). President Obama’s account of the firefight has had zero credibility from the outset and it continues to fray and wear thin as each day passes. 

First, bin Laden was shooting. Then he wasn’t. Now, no pictures are going to be released. Ridiculous arguments on CNN, by House members stating that releasing photos would inflame and invite retaliation, flatly contradict what I suspect every grunt who ever earned a Combat Infantry Badge would say:

“Release the damn pictures. Give us some to hand out to the “indigs”. We got our man and that’s a message to anyone who would mess with us…Hoo Ah!”

However, as with 9-11, in order to fully appreciate the stupidity of the Obama Administration’s ploy it is only necessary to focus on one glaring inconsistency. With our focus on this inconsistency, demand an answer to it and bring down a house of cards that is already falling. This approach is essentially the same path I have taken with the War Game exercises that were being conducted on September 11^th. The issue that follows is to focus on what to do with this inconsistency.

9/11 BACK ON THE TABLE?

This also raises a fair question: Is 9-11 back on the table for me?

The answer is yes and no. Especially when “no” applies to any expectation that a competent, trustworthy court with jurisdiction would act with a budget and full approval of the U.S. Congress and the American people to actually reveal the truth and take action.

It is yes when, as you will hear below, responsible and credible academics and journalists see the direct connection between September 11,2001 and where we are today… and where we are headed as a planet.

This is because it is not possible to accurately understand or respond to Collapse without “seeing” all the criminality that led to it. Moreover, it is not possible to effectively deal with Collapse until the criminal behavior has been identified, addressed, and effectively terminated. Otherwise, the human race is left to confront Collapse as it is now; on an ad hoc basis, without any participation of sincere, honest and focused governmental bodies.

There is a massive awakening-taking place globally. However, the difference between this and what could be accomplished if governments were actively and helpfully involved is… maybe three billion human lives.

Now, back to Osama bin Laden.

Let’s start with what I consider the most-obvious proof that the Obama administration is lying. It comes from a world-class microbiologist who allowed me to use this quote on condition of anonymity. The simple proof of his accuracy is to just ask any microbiologist experienced in DNA sequencing about his statement. There are tens of thousands of them around the world.

Here is what he wrote me:

I am a molecular biologist and I’ve built a lucrative career in human genetics. I have run one of the world’s largest and most productive DNA genotyping facilities and now I am helping to build the global market for clinical whole human genome sequencing for the world’s largest human genome sequencing facility. I

have worked with the absolute best genome scientists from the military, academia, medicine, and industry from around the world. I know DNA. And, one thing I know about DNA is that you cannot, repeat CANNOT: take a tissue sample from a shot-in-the-noggin-dead-guy in a north central Pakistan special forces op, extract the DNA, prepare the DNA for assay, test the DNA, curate the raw DNA sequence data, assemble the reads or QC the genotype, compare the tested DNA to a reference, and make a positive identity determination… all in 12 hours- let alone transport the tissue samples all the places they’d need to have gone in order to get this done.

Some might try to argue that ruggedized, field ready kits could test a DNA sample- which is true if one is attempting to determine the CLASS of a bacteria. It is not true if one is trying to determine the specific identity of an individual. Any way you slice it, the real work would require days, and I find it unlikely (although not impossible) that an aircraft carrier would have a laboratory outfitted for this kind of work… it is not the Starship Enterprise out there.

So, maybe they did get Osama. But there is no fucking way they had any genetic proof of it by the time they dumped the body over the side. What is it that we are not supposed to see with all this distraction? I think the French call it “legerdemain”.

The only things necessary to prove or disprove this statement is to question anyone who is an expert on DNA identification.

Two more examples illustrate the lack of credibility enjoyed by the U.S. government. The first is from Tuesday’s (5-3-2011) World News Desk. The second is from today’s (5-5-2011).

EXAMPLE 1

White House backtracks on how Osama bin Laden died in US raid – Telegraph

“Claims that the al-Qaeda leader had died while firing an automatic weapon at commandos were withdrawn, with President Barack Obama’s spokesman admitting “he was unarmed”. A dramatic description of bin Laden using his wife as a “human shield” and forcing her to sacrifice her life also proved to be false. The woman was still alive and was taken into custody with several of the terrorist’s children.

In an embarrassing climb-down, Barack Obama’s press secretary, Jay Carney, admitted that the previous version of events — which came mostly from the chief US counter-terrorism adviser, John Brennan — had been put out “with great haste”.

The about-turn left the US open to accusations of a cover-up and led to calls for video footage of the raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and images of bin Laden’s body to be released to end conspiracy theories.”  

EXAMPLE 2

Even the Pentagon is staying away from the White House circus. Here’s a quote from a DoD publication. The story’s title? “The Bin Laden Information Drought”.

No one is complaining that bin Laden is dead. But every time Washington has to change details about what happened, it damages its credibility on the whole story. And instead of continuing to feed the ravenous reporters clamoring for information, officials are starving them: The Pentagon today cancelled its regular briefing for the second day in a row, even as the White House refers some questions about the bin Laden story to the Defense Department.

Now I am not going to do what we found necessary to do after 9-11, by making a huge (ever-growing) list of the galaxy of inconsistencies available. I am not going to repeat the work of myself and others, like Michel Chossudovsky and Paul Thompson, on the mythological intelligence construct that was the legend of OBL. That is all meticulously documented in “Crossing the Rubicon”.

But as the world continues to ask the obvious questions and the story continues to fray, I note that the indignant refusal by Barack Obama to produce a photo is really setting off alarms. In the past, it was an essential foreign requirement to produce death photos of Josef Goebbels, Herman Goering and Saddam Hussein. No one thought that unseemly. Granted their bodies were all intact, but I should probably note that the credibility of the United States Government was – like the dollar – more intact then.

I saw a “crawl” on CNN stating that George W. Bush declined to appear at Ground Zero with President Obama for a planned extravaganza today. Even W has got enough sense to avoid that black hole. And today we see that apparently the plans for a PR extravaganza were quashed by someone telling the President to “Shut the f*** up” and keep it simple. Obama laid a wreath, shut his mouth and got the Hell out of Dodge.

The more Barack Obama beats the 9-11 drum, the more he is going to invite a bitch slap from people and even governments around the world who understand that the 9-11 story has been a lie since before the attacks occurred.

The following interview, which I gave to a German radio station catering to intellectuals and academics, about a week before the announcement of OBL’s death, is real evidence that much of the world is waiting to pounce on 9-11 anyway, especially as the rubble threatens to bury us.

You see people will accept lies if their lives get better. As their lives get worse, they will inevitably ask questions. And as their lives disintegrate, they will start looking for both answers and suspects. That was and is the swimming pool full of gasoline that Barack Obama is lighting matches in.

If the United States of America does not immediately announce a massive drawdown in Afghanistan, the world will keep asking questions about OBL because our lives will be getting worse, not better, by the day. And every time Mr. Obama opens his mouth about 9-11, he pours more gasoline into the pool and asks for another box of matches.

It was not my choice. Barack Obama has placed 9-11 back on the table again. Mainstream media, of course, can’t say Jack Diddly about this theater of the absurd, even though they’ve been cornered into asking a few pseudo-hardball questions. They are, after all, criminally culpable for the endorsement and concealment of something they damn well knew was a lie, murder, and high treason ten years ago.

U.S.-Pakistani Relations Beyond Bin Laden

 

By George Friedman

The past week has been filled with announcements and speculations on how Osama bin Laden was killed and on Washington’s source of intelligence. After any operation of this sort, the world is filled with speculation on sources and methods by people who don’t know, and silence or dissembling by those who do.

Obfuscating on how intelligence was developed and on the specifics of how an operation was carried out is an essential part of covert operations. The precise process must be distorted to confuse opponents regarding how things actually played out; otherwise, the enemy learns lessons and adjusts. Ideally, the enemy learns the wrong lessons, and its adjustments wind up further weakening it.

Operational disinformation is the final, critical phase of covert operations. So as interesting as it is to speculate on just how the United States located bin Laden and on exactly how the attack took place, it is ultimately not a fruitful discussion. Moreover, it does not focus on the truly important question, namely, the future of U.S.-Pakistani relations.

Posturing Versus a Genuine Breach

It is not inconceivable that Pakistan aided the United States in identifying and capturing Osama bin Laden, but it is unlikely. This is because the operation saw the already-tremendous tensions between the two countries worsen rather than improve. The Obama administration let it be known that it saw Pakistan as either incompetent or duplicitous and that it deliberately withheld plans for the operation from the Pakistanis. For their part, the Pakistanis made it clear that further operations of this sort on Pakistani territory could see an irreconcilable breach between the two countries. The attitudes of the governments profoundly affected the views of politicians and the public, attitudes that will be difficult to erase.

Posturing designed to hide Pakistani cooperation would be designed to cover operational details, not to lead to significant breaches between countries. The relationship between the United States and Pakistan ultimately is far more important than the details of how Osama bin Laden was captured, but both sides have created a tense atmosphere that they will find difficult to contain. One would not sacrifice strategic relationships for the sake of operational security. Therefore, we have to assume that the tension is real and revolves around the different goals of Pakistan and the United States.

A break between the United States and Pakistan holds significance for both sides. For Pakistan, it means the loss of an ally that could help Pakistan fend off its much larger neighbor to the east, India. For the United States, it means the loss of an ally in the war in Afghanistan. Whether the rupture ultimately occurs, of course, depends on how deep the tension goes. And that depends on what the tension is over, i.e., whether the tension ultimately merits the strategic rift. It also is a question of which side is sacrificing the most. It is therefore important to understand the geopolitics of U.S.-Pakistani relations beyond the question of who knew what about bin Laden.

From Cold to Jihadist War

U.S. strategy in the Cold War included a religious component, namely, using religion to generate tension within the Communist bloc. This could be seen in the Jewish resistance in the Soviet Union, in Roman Catholic resistance in Poland and, of course, in Muslim resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, it took the form of using religious Islamist militias to wage a guerrilla war against Soviet occupation. A three-part alliance involving the Saudis, the Americans and the Pakistanis fought the Soviets. The Pakistanis had the closest relationships with the Afghan resistance due to ethnic and historical bonds, and the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), had built close ties with the Afghans.
As frequently happens, the lines of influence ran both ways. The ISI did not simply control Islamist militants, but instead many within the ISI came under the influence of radical Islamist ideology. This reached the extent that the ISI became a center of radical Islamism, not so much on an institutional level as on a personal level: The case officers, as the phrase goes, went native. As long as the U.S. strategy remained to align with radical Islamism against the Soviets, this did not pose a major problem. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States lost interest in the future of Afghanistan, managing the conclusion of the war fell to the Afghans and to the Pakistanis through the ISI. In the civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States played a trivial role. It was the ISI in alliance with the Taliban — a coalition of Afghan and international Islamist fighters who had been supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan — that shaped the future of Afghanistan

The U.S.- Islamist relationship was an alliance of convenience for both sides. It was temporary, and when the Soviets collapsed, Islamist ideology focused on new enemies, the United States chief among them. Anti-Soviet sentiment among radical Islamists soon morphed into anti-American sentiment. This was particularly true after the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and Desert Storm. The Islamists perceived the U.S. occupation and violation of Saudi territorial integrity as a religious breach. Therefore, at least some elements of international Islamism focused on the United States; al Qaeda was central among these elements. Al Qaeda needed a base of operations after being expelled from Sudan, and Afghanistan provided the most congenial home. In moving to Afghanistan and allying with the Taliban, al Qaeda inevitably was able to greatly expand its links with Pakistan’s ISI, which was itself deeply involved with the Taliban.

After 9/11, Washington demanded that the Pakistanis aid the United States in its war against al Qaeda and the Taliban. For Pakistan, this represented a profound crisis. On the one hand, Pakistan badly needed the United States to support it against what it saw as its existential enemy, India. On the other hand, Islamabad found it difficult to rupture or control the intimate relationships, ideological and personal, that had developed between the ISI and the Taliban, and by extension with al Qaeda to some extent. In Pakistani thinking, breaking with the United States could lead to strategic disaster with India. However, accommodating the United States could lead to unrest, potential civil war and even collapse by energizing elements of the ISI and supporters of Taliban and radical Islamism in Pakistan.

The Pakistani Solution

The Pakistani solution was to appear to be doing everything possible to support the United States in Afghanistan, with a quiet limit on what that support would entail. That limit on support set by Islamabad was largely defined as avoiding actions that would trigger a major uprising in Pakistan that could threaten the regime. Pakistanis were prepared to accept a degree of unrest in supporting the war but not to push things to the point of endangering the regime.

The Pakistanis thus walked a tightrope between demands they provide intelligence on al Qaeda and Taliban activities and permit U.S. operations in Pakistan on one side and the internal consequences of doing so on the other. The Pakistanis’ policy was to accept a degree of unrest to keep the Americans supporting Pakistan against India, but only to a point. So, for example, the government purged the ISI of its overt supporters of radial Islamism, but it did not purge the ISI wholesale nor did it end informal relations between purged intelligence officers and the ISI. Pakistan thus pursued a policy that did everything to appear to be cooperative while not really meeting American demands.

The Americans were, of course, completely aware of the Pakistani limits and did not ultimately object to this arrangement. The United States did not want a coup in Islamabad, nor did it want massive civil unrest. The United States needed Pakistan on whatever terms the Pakistanis could provide help. It needed the supply line through Pakistan from Karachi to the Khyber Pass. And while it might not get complete intelligence from Pakistan, the intelligence it did get was invaluable. Moreover, while the Pakistanis could not close the Afghan Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, they could limit them and control their operation to some extent. The Americans were as aware as the Pakistanis that the choice was between full and limited cooperation, but could well be between limited and no cooperation, because the government might well not survive full cooperation. The Americans thus took what they could get.

Obviously, this relationship created friction. The Pakistani position was that the United States had helped create this reality in the 1980s and 1990s. The American position was that after 9/11, the price of U.S. support involved the Pakistanis changing their policies. The Pakistanis said there were limits. The Americans agreed, so the fight was about defining the limits.
The Americans felt that the limit was support for al Qaeda. They felt that whatever Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban was, support in suppressing al Qaeda, a separate organization, had to be absolute. The Pakistanis agreed in principle but understood that the intelligence on al Qaeda flowed most heavily from those most deeply involved with radical Islamism. In others words, the very people who posed the most substantial danger to Pakistani stability were also the ones with the best intelligence on al Qaeda — and therefore, fulfilling the U.S. demand in principle was desirable. In practice, it proved difficult for Pakistan to carry out.

The Breakpoint and the U.S. Exit From Afghanistan

This proved the breakpoint between the two sides. The Americans accepted the principle of Pakistani duplicity, but drew a line at al Qaeda. The Pakistanis understood American sensibilities but didn’t want to incur the domestic risks of going too far. This psychological breakpoint cracked open on Osama bin Laden, the Holy Grail of American strategy and the third rail of Pakistani policy.

Under normal circumstances, this level of tension of institutionalized duplicity should have blown the U.S.-Pakistani relationship apart, with the United States simply breaking with Pakistan. It did not, and likely will not for a simple geopolitical reason, one that goes back to the 1990s. In the 1990s, when the United States no longer needed to support an intensive covert campaign in Afghanistan, it depended on Pakistan to manage Afghanistan. Pakistan would have done this anyway because it had no choice: Afghanistan was Pakistan’s backdoor, and given tensions with India, Pakistan could not risk instability in its rear. The United States thus did not have to ask Pakistan to take responsibility for Afghanistan.

The United States is now looking for an exit from Afghanistan. Its goal, the creation of a democratic, pro-American Afghanistan able to suppress radical Islamism in its own territory, is unattainable with current forces — and probably unattainable with far larger forces. Gen. David Petraeus, the architect of the Afghan strategy, has been nominated to become the head of the CIA. With Petraeus departing from the Afghan theater, the door is open to a redefinition of Afghan strategy. Despite Pentagon doctrines of long wars, the United States is not going to be in a position to engage in endless combat in Afghanistan. There are other issues in the world that must be addressed. With bin Laden’s death, a plausible (if not wholly convincing) argument can be made that the mission in AfPak, as the Pentagon refers to the theater, has been accomplished, and therefore the United States can withdraw.

No withdrawal strategy is conceivable without a viable Pakistan. Ideally, Pakistan would be willing to send forces into Afghanistan to carry out U.S. strategy. This is unlikely, as the Pakistanis don’t share the American concern for Afghan democracy, nor are they prepared to try directly to impose solutions in Afghanistan. At the same time, Pakistan can’t simply ignore Afghanistan because of its own national security issues, and therefore it will move to stabilize it.

The United States could break with Pakistan and try to handle things on its own in Afghanistan, but the supply line fueling Afghan fighting runs through Pakistan. The alternatives either would see the United States become dependent on Russia — an equally uncertain line of supply — or on the Caspian route, which is insufficient to supply forces. Afghanistan is war at the end of the Earth for the United States, and to fight it, Washington must have Pakistani supply routes.

The United States also needs Pakistan to contain, at least to some extent, Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan. The United States is stretched to the limit doing what it is doing in Afghanistan. Opening a new front in Pakistan, a country of 180 million people, is well beyond the capabilities of either forces in Afghanistan or forces in the U.S. reserves. Therefore, a U.S. break with Pakistan threatens the logistical foundation of the war in Afghanistan and poses strategic challenges U.S. forces cannot cope with.

The American option might be to support a major crisis between Pakistan and India to compel Pakistan to cooperate with the United States. However, it is not clear that India is prepared to play another round in the U.S. game with Pakistan. Moreover, creating a genuine crisis between India and Pakistan could have two outcomes. The first involves the collapse of Pakistan, which would create an India more powerful than the United States might want. The second and more likely outcome would see the creation of a unity government in Pakistan in which distinctions between secularists, moderate Islamists and radical Islamists would be buried under anti-Indian feeling. Doing all of this to deal with Afghan withdrawal would be excessive, even if India played along, and could well prove disastrous for Washington.

Ultimately, the United States cannot change its policy of the last 10 years. During that time, it has come to accept what support the Pakistanis could give and tolerated what was withheld. U.S. dependence on Pakistan so long as Washington is fighting in Afghanistan is significant; the United States has lived with Pakistan’s multitiered policy for a decade because it had to. Nothing in the capture of bin Laden changes the geopolitical realities. So long as the United States wants to wage — or end — a war in Afghanistan, it must have the support of Pakistan to the extent that Pakistan is prepared to provide support. The option of breaking with Pakistan because on some level it is acting in opposition to American interests does not exist.

 

This is the ultimate contradiction in U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and even the so-called war on terror as a whole. The United States has an absolute opposition to terrorism and has waged a war in Afghanistan on the questionable premise that the tactic of terrorism can be defeated, regardless of source or ideology. Broadly fighting terrorism requires the cooperation of the Muslim world, as U.S. intelligence and power is inherently limited. The Muslim world has an interest in containing terrorism, but not the absolute concern the United States has. Muslim countries are not prepared to destabilize their countries in service to the American imperative. This creates deeper tensions between the United States and the Muslim world and increases the American difficulty in dealing with terrorism — or with Afghanistan.

The United States must either develop the force and intelligence to wage war without any assistance — which is difficult to imagine given the size of the Muslim world and the size of the U.S. military — or it will have to accept half-hearted support and duplicity. Alternatively, it could accept that it will not win in Afghanistan and will not be able simply to eliminate terrorism. These are difficult choices, but the reality of Pakistan drives home that these, in fact, are the choices.

PAKISTAN AND OBAMA’S INDIAN VISIT

 

by INAYATULLAH

Can we afford to be friendly with a neighbour which is bent upon demonizing, defaming and down grading our country?

It buys arms – state of the art military weapons from all over the world – but raises hue and cry if Pakistan makes a bid for the purchase of air force planes or old frigates or a used submarine. It strikes an unprecedented deal with USA on the supply of nuclear reactors and assured supplies of related material which involves the violation of US laws and NPT provisions but cannot tolerate Pakistan getting two small nuclear reactors from China. It grabs Siachin and refuses to settle the dispute about it. It pledges to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir to ascertain the wishes of its people but reneges on it on flimsy excuses. It invades a part of Pakistan and breaks the country into two, holds tens of thousands of Pakistani soldiers and civilians, prisoners in Indian jails. It builds dams on rivers flowing into Pakistan violating the Indus Basin Treaty and Pakistan has to resort to arbitration to get the design of the dam rectified.

Why am I highlighting Indian anti-Pakistan doings? The reason for recalling India’s unfriendly acts is the news that the first stop of the American president’s visit to India will be Mumbai. Not only is he being put up in the Taj hotel, he will be attending a ceremony to project to the world the 26/11attack on part of the city by terrorists having links with Pakistan. India thus would be reinforcing the impression that Pakistan is a country which keeps sponsoring international terrorism. If there is one fear which the world cannot take lightly, it is the threat of terrorism. There are also reports that India will deepen its plans to involve USA in developing a joint mechanism to counter terrorism and may enter into an agreement, during Obama’s visit – something which may have adverse repercussions for Pakistan.

What line of approach should Pakistan have in regard to Obama’s visit to India? While we will be well-advised not to overreact, there is no harm in expressing our concerns and demands.

We should make Kashmir an issue of importance for peace in this region. It makes sense to convey our anxiety about the brutal reign of state terrorism let loose by the government of India for the last two decades. Now that even India acknowledges that the protests in Kashmir are indigenous and more or less peaceful and no material support is provided by Pakistan, India needs to be told to seriously consider the question of finally settling this burning issue. The least Obama may do is to advise the Indians to stop perpetrating atrocities on the un-armed Kashmiri protesters. He may well take note of rising voices even in India for conceding Azadi to the Kashmiris. Here two points need to be made. One, president Obama is well-aware of the disputed nature of the Indian occupation of the state and the significance of the still very much valid UN resolutions. Two, it is very much in the interest of USA if relations between India and Pakistan improve and move towards normalcy. Americans want Pakistan to deploy more troops on its western borders to fight the Taliban. This could happen only if the Indian threat in the east, recedes. Obama understands the need for urgency in the matter. That is why during his election campaign he expressed a desire to appoint a special envoy for this purpose

The turn of events in Afghanistan has added to Pakistan’s value and weight for the success of US plans in this region. Americans want a respectable exit from Afghanistan. To achieve this, they have to come to terms, with give and take, with the Taliban. Pakistan’s role in strategizing talks with Taliban is crucial for a successful settlement of a future dispensation. Pakistan indeed holds a pivotal position in the region and can no longer remain hyphenated with Afghanistan. Indeed the key to the peace and stability of the region lies in the way India-Pakistan relations change for the better and this very much depends on the settlement of the unresolved disputes and issues hanging fire between the two countries.

In an interview with the Press Trust of India, president Barack Obama expressed his desire to raise the Indo-US cooperation to “a new level” and said that because of shared values and interests, he would support “India’s rise to a global power”. He described the relationship between the two countries as “an indispensable partnership” and added that “I see India as a cornerstone of America’s engagement in Asia”. In response to India’s demand to act against Pakistan he said that his government had told Islamabad that it had “a special responsibility” to bring the perpetrators of 26/11 Mumbai attack to justice, “transparently fully and urgently”. At the same time, he pointed out that “Pakistan is taking important steps and making sacrifices in our shared fight against extremism and we will continue to underscore the importance of taking additional action (emphasis added) to eliminate terrorist safe havens”.

Interesting to find how Obama responded to a reference about New Delhi’s expectations of his support for UNSC membership and transfer of dual use technology. He confined his response to the remark that these were “difficult and very complicated issues”.

Much food for thought in the mentioned statements of the US president on the eve of his visit to India. We need to carefully watch the visit and build our own strategy about our relationship with US, keeping in view the fall out of the new developments for Pakistan.

A good time to re-examine our concerns and interests and how these can be successfully addressed in the context of India’s strategic partnership with USA and the way the end game in Afghanistan plays out.

The writer is a political and international relations analyst.

Email: pacade@brain.net.pk / pacadepak@gmail.com